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The ongoing process of globalization, which is boosted by technological and
political catalysts as well, increasingly raises public concerns. It is feared that
international integration will be accompanied by national disintegration, since
the income distribution in rich countries will become less uniform. Moreover,
policy-makers become aware of the fact that global competition also encom-
passes their realm, because it constrains the scope for independent national
policies. However, they should refrain from restricting global competition by
protectionistic measures, because substantial gains from globalization for the
world economy in general and terms-of-trade improvements for industrial coun-
tries in particular are at stake.
J.E.L-Classification: F02When the turn of a century approaches, perceptions of the future tend to be-
come gloomy. At the turn to the 21st century, one of the gloomy catchwords is
"globalization", which is associated with concerns and sorrows about economic
prospects of highly developed countries. It is feared that they will not be able to
withstand the storms of global competition which will eventually destroy the
wage gap against poor countries and will raze social standards to the ground all
around the globe. "One world, ready or not", is the title of a best-selling book,
and many observers are concerned that people are not ready yet.
It is the basic message of this paper that the public debate strongly overrates
the risks of globalization and almost completely ignores its opportunities. Most
of the concerns raised today against globalization could similarily have been
raised against the expansion of international trade in the 1960s. Import com-
petition in those days was also threatening domestic jobs and put labor-inten-
sive and standardized industries in advanced economies under strain. In retro-
spective, however, the sixties appear as the "golden age", when an increased
international division of labor opened up rich export opportunities, created
numerous new jobs, and fostered economic growth and welfare in all open,
internationally oriented economies. There is good reason to believe that the
current wave of globalization will once also be regarded as a period of rich
opportunities which will eventually lift all boats.
The structure of the paper is as follows: part I analyzes the concept of globali-
zation in the context of the theory of international economics, part II analyzes
the driving forces for a more integrated world economy, part III discusses the
constraints of globalization, part IV presents some evidence on the potential
gains from globalization and concludes.
Paper prepared for the Conference "21st Century Dynamics: Anatomy of a Long
Boom", held by the OECD in Frankfurt, December 2-3, 1998.-2-
I. Visions of an Integrated World Economy
No doubt, globalization is an increasingly fashionable term. If one looks up the
titles of publications which contain the word "globalization" (or: globalisation) at
the library of the Kiel Institute of World Economics, one will find not more than
36 entries for the year 1990. For the year 1997, the number of entries increases
to 212, which is equivalent to a growth rate of 30 per cent per year.
There is still no unequivocal definition of what globalization means and what it
does not mean. For some observers, it describes the tremendous increase of
trade and capital flows in the recent past, for others it is a catchword for the
ubiquitous availability of all kind of information, for the emergence of world-wide
production networks, or for the assimilation of life-styles in the global village. All
these perceptions have in common that globalization raises the level of integra-
tion in the world economy.
As the suffix "zation" points out, globalization describes a process, not a state of
affairs. From an economist's point of view, globalization can be defined as the
process of converting separate national economies into an integrated world
economy. This conversion is basically achieved through three channels:
— The first channel is international trade, which is still the basic and most
important link between national economies.
— The second channel is international factor movements, which are mainly
confined to capital flows, whereas the international mobility of workers is still
rather low.
— The third channel is the international diffusion of technology, which is only
partly a by-product of international flows of goods and capital and in-
creasingly rests upon intangible cross-border flows of information.
The immediate result of globalization is an increase of competitive pressures in
virtually all areas of the economy. Figure 1 illustrates the main features of a-3-
world economy where national borders have lost their significance and where
global competition is prevalent. It is based upon a simple model with two coun-
tries, two production factors (capital and labor), and an independent govern-
ment in each country. Production factors are employed by firms which compete
with each other in the domestic market and with foreign firms in world markets.
Figure 1 — Basic Elements of Global Competition
As a result of product competition, it can be expected that there will remain no
substantial differences in product prices between the two countries. Standard
models of trade theory tell us that this equalization of product prices will be suf-
ficient for equalising also real wages and interest rates. However, this factor
price equalization theorem rests upon a number of restrictive assumptions
which are not very realistic. For instance, it assumes the complete absence of
any transport costs or other types of trade barriers. And, more important, it
postulates identical technologies all over the world.
1 In the real world, where
shipping goods across long distances is costly and where some countries are
1 Gottfried Haberler (1955) even argued that the factor price equalization theorem
actually proves the opposite of what it claims to prove because its assumptions are
much too restrictive for ever being fulfilled.-4-
technologically ahead of others, it can be expected that international trade will
tend to level factor prices, but will not succeed in completely eliminating any
international factor price differentials.
Remaining factor price differentials are the stimulus for international factor flows
which give rise to international factor price competition. If capital is free to move
across national borders, international interest rates will differ only with respect
to different risk premiums, but not with respect to the capital endowment of
countries. Real wages in rich countries will not benefit any longer from a better
equipment with physical capital, because capital will flow to those places where
the rate of return is highest. If capital mobility is supplemented by unrestrained
international flows of technology, factor price equalization will also apply to real
wage levels, even if international mobility of labor is low. Under such conditions,
international wage differentials will only be sustainable if they reflect corre-
sponding differences in the qualification of the labor force or in the general eco-
nomic conditions within the respective countries.
In former centuries, when governments were small and unimportant and nature
was a much more important production factor than today, general economic
conditions mainly depended on geographical features, i.e. on climate, the qual-
ity of soil, or the availability of ports and navigable rivers. Nowadays, the eco-
nomic capacity of locations much more depends on institutional settings which
are largely under the influence of governments. Among these settings are the
quality of communication infrastructure, the level and structure of taxes, the
validity of legal protection, the intensity of social conflicts, and the stability and
convertibility of the national currency. If countries want to attract internationally
mobile production factors, their governments have to engage in an institutional
competition with foreign governments. In a perfectly integrated world economy,
where distance costs have completely vanished, the relative wage level of
regions exclusively depends upon the relative performance of governments in
institutional competition.-5-
The major result of globalization is the extension of competition from the level
of firms to the level of governments. The position of governments in global
competition can be compared to landlords of hotels who have to attract mobile
guests. If the service offered is poor or too expensive, guests will pass by and
the landlord will have to improve the service or to lower the price. Equivalent^,
internationally mobile investors will chose locations with either low costs and
poor infrastructure or with high costs and excellent infrastructure, but will surely
avoid locations with high costs and poor infrastructure. This type of competition,
which is labelled as "institutional competition" in Figure 1, can also be refered to
as "locational competition" (which is a poor, although the best available trans-
lation of the German term "Standortwettbewerb"), because it is concerned with
the relative attractiveness of business locations for internationally mobile
factors.
All in all, it can be expected that all types of global competition will increase
aggregate welfare: product competition will enrich consumption opportunities
and will erase productive inefficiencies; factor price competition will improve
capacitiy utilization and will avoid allocative distortions; and institutional com-
petition will eliminate excessive and inefficient government activities. The vision
of an integrated world economy promises substantial "gains from globalization"
which basically result from the deepening of the international division of labor.
Hence, the pessimistic perceptions of globalization in the public are not shared
by the internationally oriented economists.
II. Catalysts of Globalization
1. Factors driving globalization
A whole string of tendencies can be observed in the world economy, causing a
reduction of market segmentations and an increasing interdependence of world
markets. Globalization is driven by the following factors:-6-
Transport and communication costs have fallen significantly in recent
decades. That is true for the traditional costs of covering distances by sea
and air (which have been reduced to approximately one fifth since the twen-
ties and thirties respectively) as well as for the costs of telecommunication.
For instance, a three minute telephone call from New York to London in
1930 cost 250 U.S.-$ (in constant prices from 1990), in 1950 still 50 U.S.-$,
and in 1990 still 3.32 U.S.-$; the price for processing information fell from
1 U.S.-$ per instruction per second in 1975 to one cent in 1994 (World Bank
1995, p. 45). The costs of using satellites have also fallen dramatically.
In information technology, the world experiences a revolution. The "web"
represents a world wide information network. In 1998, 180 million internet
stations provided a worldwide network; it will be half a billion in 2002.
The reduction of political tensions (e.g. Cold War, Apartheid in South Africa),
regional efforts towards integration, for example in Europe, and the
strengthening of multilateral trade agreements also have eliminated impedi-
ments to trade.
The radical change in the former centrally-planned economies of Central
and Eastern Europe and the opening of China has brought important
regions of the world into the international division of labor. Taking India into
account, a historical process is taking place, in which more than 40 per cent
of the world's population is integrated into the world economy. This implies
that the limitation of the size of markets, which was a possible barrier for the
extension of the international division of labor in the past, will be less impor-
tant in the future.
• Most developing and newly industrializing countries have changed their
strategies for development and foreign trade and are now much more open.
44 countries have joined GATT/WTO from 1986 to 1998. As of 1998, 31
countries want to become members of the WTO.
• Apart from measures which explicitly restrict trade, national regulations are
increasingly reviewed. They are continuously adjusted in the process of
institutional competition, thus resulting in less impediments as well.-7-
The decline of transport and communication costs over the past decades is
illustrated in Figure 2. The "death of distance" (Cairncross, 1997) facilitates the
establishment and monitoring of international production networks, enlarges
trading areas, and enables firms to exploit international cost differentials by the
fragmentation and relocation of production and global sourcing.
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Charges for using satellites
Source: World Bank (1995, p. 62).
At present, the integration into a global world of information is much easier for
rich countries than for poor ones. In rich countries like the United States or
Singapore the availability of information and communication equipment is sig-
nificantly superior than in poor countries such as China or India (Table 1). As
the relative prices of these appliances are declining, however, it can be ex--8-
Table 1 — Information and Communication Equipment per 100 Inhabitants by



























Source: Cairncross (1997, p. 22).
pected that the connection of poor countries to the world pool of information will
considerably improve in the near future.
The technological engines of globalization are supported and complemented by
political engines such as the above mentioned transition from centrally planned
to market economies, the liberalization approaches of several developing
countries, and the international negotiations about trade and investment bar-
riers in the GATT/WTO framework. The significance of declining trade barriers
is illustrated in Figure 3 which describes the development of average tariff rates
for the United States since the 1940s. By and large, the tariff rates of other in-
dustrial countries are similar, whereas the tariff rates of developing countries
are in general at a higher level. Over time, however, also the tariff rates of
developing countries are substantially declining.
Of course, the international trading system is still far away from free trade in
several areas, notably in agriculture, textiles, and clothings. And severe prob-
lems will have to be solved before international trade in services will really be-
come free. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that trade liberalization has
significantly contributed to the integration of the world economy over the past
decades.-9-











0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source: Bhagwati (1989); own calculations.
2. Indicators of a more integrated world economy
As globalization is a complex phenomenon, there is no universal indicator
which would undoubtedly reveal the distance of the real world from the perfectly
integrated world economy. The degree of integration between national econo-
mies cannot be measured directly. Hence, one has to rely upon indirect meas-
ures which inevitably give room for different measurement concepts and alter-
native economic interpretations.
A rather simple, although highly instructive indicator of globalization is provided
by the growth rates of world output and world trade. By and large, the volume of
international trade grows twice as fast as the volume of world output. This
development suggests that the international division of labor is deepening and
the world economy becomes increasingly integrated (WTO, 1998). A similar
development can be observed for the OECD where gross domestic product at-10-
constant prices rose by 60 per cent since the mid 1970s, whereas exports rose
by 160 per cent (Figure 4). This, however, can be observed not only in the last
thirty years, but since the end of World War II. Apparently, the gap between ex-
port growth and GDP growth has further enlarged in the recent past, which
points to an increase in the speed of globalization. Of course, this indicator
covers only one aspect of globalization — namely the integration of the world
economy via international trade in goods.
As mentioned above, the second major channel of globalization are interna-
tional flows of capital. Their importance can be assessed by the development of
foreign direct investment (FDI), which is directly concerned with the emergence
of international production networks. Unfortunately, the available statistics do
not provide any information about FDI in real terms. Some authors simply com-
pare the development of nominal FDI to the development of real output, which
is obviously misleading because meaningful indicators of globalization should
Figure 4 — Gross Domestic Product, Exports, and Foreign Direct Investment of










1980 1985 1990 1995
Source: OECD; own calculations.-11 -
be calculated either completely in nominal terms or completely in real terms. In
order to avoid inflationary distortions, the FDI data in Figure 4 were deflated by
the implicit price index of gross domestic product of OECD countries.
2 Accord-
ing to these calculations, the importance of international investment flows
diminished in the early 1980s and strongly recovered thereafter. All in all, FDI
expenditures are apparently much less stable than exports and output. Two
distinct waves of globalization via FDI can be identified, which peaked around
1990 and 1995. Over the whole period since 1975, the expansion of FDI corre-
sponds to the expansion of exports, which indicates that international capital
flows can indeed be regarded as the second major channel of globalization.
3
Among the larger OECD countries, FDI dominated in Germany, France, Japan,
and the United States, whereas in Italy and in the United Kingdom globalization
was mainly driven by exports (Figure 5). On the other hand, it should be kept in
mind that the international integration of production networks cannot only be
achieved by outward FDI (which is presented in Figure 5), but also by inward
FDI which is especially important for the United Kingdom. With respect to the
elimination of international factor price differentials, outflows and inflows of for-
eign investment are working into the same direction.
Figures 4 and 5 look at investment capital and ignore international flows of
financial capital which have reached impressive levels in recent years. Accord-
ing to the Bank for International Settlement, international currency transactions
(which are only a fraction of international financial transactions) account for
1490 billion U.S.-$ per day in 1998, which is an increase of 26 per cent against
1995 and an increase of 150 per cent against 1989 (NZZ, October 19, 1998,
p. 10). Nevertheless, there are still reasonable doubts whether the world capital
markets can really be regarded as perfectly integrated.
2 Moreover, FDI figures from 1975 to 1980 had to be estimated by aggregate data for
the whole 1970s. For an alternative picture based on IMF data compare Figure 2.2
in Siebert (1997b).
3 For a detained analysis of the structure and determinants of foreign direct invest-
ment see Klodt (1998).-12-
Figure 5— Increase in Gross Domestic Product, Exports, and Foreign Direct







































These doubts were originally raised by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka,
who argued that a perfectly integrated world capital market could be regarded
as a financial pool where savers put their money in and investors take their
money out — irrespective of the national origin of savings and investment.
Under such conditions, there should be no systematic relationship between the
savings ratio and the investment ratio of a country, because a high propensity
to save would only by accident go hand in hand with rich and promising invest-
ment opportunities.-13.-.
However, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found a rather stable relationship be-
tween the savings and the investment ratio across countries. This observation,
which became known as the Feldstein-Horioka-Puzzle, was confirmed in
several other studies. Moreover, Mark Taylor (1996) found that international
capital mobility among the G7 countries was even higher in the late 19th cen-
tury than in the 1970s and 1980s and only slightly lower than in the 1990s.
There are several objections to these findings which cannot be discussed at
length in this paper. For instance, the argument of Taylor ignores that interna-
tional capital mobility today covers many more countries than in the past cen-
tury. And more important, it covers countries with much larger differences in
their wage rates and technological levels, which gives more room for exploiting
international cost and productivity differentials by relocations of capital. With re-
spect to the Feldstein-Horioka-argument, the basic objection is that countries
may be affected by external shocks which influence savings and investment
behavior into the same direction. Therefore, a parallel development of national
savings and investment ratios does not necessarily reflect a segmentation of
national capital markets. Nevertheless, most observers agree that the
Feldstein-Horioka-coefficients at least contain some relevant information about
the integration of world capital markets.
More recent studies have revealed that the correlation between savings and
investment ratios is still significant, but declining overtime (Table 2).
4 Hence, it
can be argued that world capital markets are still far from being perfectly inte-
grated. But integration obviously proceeds which implies that globalization via
transborder flows of capital is an ongoing process which will probably continue
in the future. The underlying reasons of this development are discussed in the
following section.
4 In a perfectly integrated world capital market, the coefficient p in Table 2 should be
zero, whereas it should be unity in case of completedly segmented national capital
markets.-14-


















III. Constraints of Globalization
The driving forces of globalization — technological reduction of distance costs
and removal of artificial economic barriers between countries — have surely not
reached an end yet. It can be expected that the trend towards the integrated
world economy will steam ahead in the years to come. It should be kept in
mind, however, that history has never been and will never be a one-way road.
The success of globalization will breed its own constraints which may slow
down, if not reverse world economic integration. The process will also en-
counter other constraints.
More Redistribution and an Expansion of Welfare State?
Resistance against further globalization can be expected especially from those
groups which fear that they will be among the losers. In highly developed coun-
tries the main losers are low-qualified workers, because they are increasingly
exposed to direct and indirect factor price competition from low-wage countries.
There is still an ongoing debate among economists about the relative impor-
tance of globalization for the income and employment opportunities of skilled
and less skilled workers, but there is no doubt that the integration of China,
Eastern Europe and other labor-rich regions into the world economy will put the
wage levels in Western industrial countries under strain. In a globalized world-15-
high wages can only be earned if they correspond to the qualification level of
workers.
In the United States, the United Kingdom, and to some extent also in Japan the
national labor markets have reacted to the increased adjustment pressure from
global competition by an increase of wage differentials (Table 3). In continental
Europe, by contrast, wage dispersion remained constant or even declined. In
consequence, low-qualified workers had to face a severe deterioration of their
employment opportunities in those countries. The inadequate and inflexible
adjustment to global competition can be regarded as a major determinant of
rising structural unemployment in continental Europe (cf. Siebert, 1997a).
5




























aD1: lowest income decil; D9: second-highest income
C1994 instead of 1995.--




















5 For the European Union as a whole unemployment reached a level of 12.6 per cent
for low-qualified workers, of 8.6 per cent for medium-qualified workers, and of
5.9 per cent for high-qualified workers in 1996 (EUROSTAT, 1997).-16-
drie strategy with which the potential losers of globalization can try to minimize
their adjustment costs is that they may call for redistribution from gainers to
losers in order to participate in the aggregate welfare gains from globalization.
In principle, this strategy meets open arms in the European approach to eco-
nomic policy, for instance in the concept of the "Social Market Economy" in
which social insurance helps to accommodate structural change. It is therefore
not surprising that, as Dani Rodrik observed, open economies tend to spend
more on social security and redistributive policies than less open economies. In
his view, "the social welfare state is the flip side of the open economy" (Rodrik,
1997, p. 53).
The potential for compensating the losers of globalization by an extended social
policy are limited, however, because institutional competition restricts the power
of governments to raise taxes for financing such policies. Rodrik may be right in
concluding that the demand for redistributive policies will rise, but he ignores
that the supply of redistribution will decline. Politicians will increasingly face the
dilemma that rising claims for redistribution will be accompanied by shrinking
tax revenues. The social security systems in Europe are under severe pressure
anyhow because they create severe distortions in the labor market (tax wedge)
and because with an aging population these systems are running the risk of not
being sustainable. The scope for redistribution is limited; an increase in the
welfare state is unlikely; instead, the industrial countries in Europe are faced
with the choice which income risks (in case of unemployment) are relatively
small so that each individual can carry them out of his own economic capacity
and which risks are so large for the individual that society has to take over
these risks (Siebert 1998a).
The transfer system of the European Union (structural funds, common agricul-
tural policy) can be interpreted as an attempt to make structural adjustment
more acceptable. With the monetary union, the political demand for transfers
can be expected to rise. With the EU budget being limited to 1.12 percent of the
EU-GDP, there is a severe hurdle for an extension of transfers which would eat
aw/ay the efficiency gains that are expected from the single market.-17-
A Return of the Trade Unions?
The increased pressure on the labor market could end up in stronger trade
unions. This, however, is unlikely. Trade unions have seen an erosion of their
power in the US, the UK and a loss of membership in the continental European
countries, for instance in Germany. New production processes in teams with
more responsibility of the individual worker, the higher level of human capital
required, the decline of industrial-type jobs and the rise of the new jobs in
information technology and in the service sector in general — all these tenden-
cies make it more difficult for trade unions to organize members. The most im-
portant aspect, however, is that trade union policy will affect investment includ-
ing foreign direct investment; the capital stock, however, influences labor pro-
ductivity and thus the potential for real wages and employment. The attempt to
europeanize wage policy will not be a way out for the trade unions.
Capacity of the Political System to Solve Problems
Another serious constraint of mature economies is whether the political decision
making system is able to cope with larger shocks or reversal of economic
trends that prevailed for some decades. Japan, being used to high growth rates
until the early nineties, seems to be a case in point. One may get the impres-
sion that Japan's political system has lost its capacity to solve economic prob-
lems. Is that also true for the three major continental countries in Europe —
Italy, France and Germany? Like Japan these countries are based on consen-
sus, and not unlike Japan, they seem to be able less and less to solve major
issues such as high unemployment and the necessary reform of the social
insurance system.
A Revival of Protectionism?
Under such circumstances, it must be expected that politicians will increasingly
rely upon another strategy, i.e. the establishment of protectionistic barriers
against global competition. Such barriers can be arranged in various forms: for
instance as tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers, capital controls, Tobin taxes, social
and green standards, etc. It seems necessary, therefore, to have a careful eye
upon the development of protectionistic policies in the future.-18-
In the area of trade-related instruments, the imposition of anti-dumping actions
is one of the most important protectionist measures. In the 1990s, the signifi-
cance of these measures has strongly increased (Table 4). It would perhaps be
misguided to interpret the data of Table 4 as the beginning of protectionistic
struggles against global competition, but the large increase in the number of
actions per year should at least be taken as a first warning signal.









aYears run from 1/7 to 30/6.


















Source: Calculated from Spinanger (1997, Table 2).
A second warning signal results from the calculations of Table 5, where the
share of intra-bloc trade is provided for different trading blocs. Except for the
EU, intra-bloc trade has gained importance both in exports and imports.
6 The
numbers are not dramatic, but they may well indicate that governments start to
look for ways of escaping from global competition and the associated adjust-
ment pains in the integrated world economy.
6 For the EU, no reliable data could be calculated for the year 1990, because the
completion of the internal market in 1992 brought about substantial changes in
trade statistics. Since 1993, the statistical coverage of intra-EU trade is much lower
than beforem. Therefore, a comparison of intra-bloc shares of 1990 and 1996 would
make no sense.-19-

































Source: WTO (1997, Vol. II, p. 7).
Harmonizing Social Norms
In the public debate, harmonizing social norms is proposed as another strategy.
The starting point of this position is that social protection should not stop at
national borders, but should also apply to those countries where the imports of
advanced countries come from. The logic behind this approach is that em-
ployers in developing countries would be forced to improve their working condi-
tions if they otherwise obtained no access to the markets of developed coun-
tries. However, this logic is fallacious for different reasons:
—- Firstly, from an employer's point of view social standards are just another
form of non-wage labor costs. They can only be increased at the expense of
the wage level. As the demand for social protection is income-elastic, rich
countries should refrain from imposing their conceptions about social
security upon poorer countries which probably prefer higher wages instead
of higher social standards.
— Secondly, social standards in international trade may cause substitution
effects between the international sector and the domestic sector in
developing countries. For instance, if advanced countries ban the import of-20-
"" goods which are produced with child labor, children would probably be
; driven into local industries where working conditions may be even worse.
In many cases, the demand for social standards in international trade is not
motivated by solidarity with exploited workers in poor countries, but basically
aims at sheltering high-wage jobs in advanced countries from low-wage com-
petition. The price of such a "social protection" would have to be paid by the
developing countries which would face reduced opportunities of integrating into
the world economy and by consumers in developed countries who would have
to face higher import prices.
Reducing Financial Volatility
The financial crisis in South East Asia, the fragility of the banking sector in
Japan, the crisis in Russia, the potential instability of Latin American countries
like Brazil, and the increased risk aversion in the financial sector in the US have
made clear that volatility in the financial sector has an impact on the real sphere
of the economy. Globalization also means more globalized financial markets.
Many solutions to these issues have been discussed, but the punch line of all
solutions must be that each country has to anticipate the negative impact that a
financial crisis will have for its own development. Thus, countries can not rely
on international efforts to help them. They have to take stability at home more
seriously by applying a stricter bank regulation, by including investment banks
and hedge funds in a regulatory framework, by preventing a bubble from devel-
oping, by a more stability oriented policy. "Stability begins at home" will be an
important slogan for the new world economy. This, however, implies that stabil-
ity constraints have to be taken into consideration early on. This will be a re-
straint on excessive growth; it will, however, be helpful in steering the econo-
mies to a long-run growth path.-21 -
Environmental Sustainability
Another constraint for the world economy is the environment as a sink, i.e. as a
receptable of wastes. The issue is not national environmental quality as a re-
straint for national development, the issue of the next century are global en-
vironmental goods.
If the evaluation of the overwhelming majority of natural scientists is taken seri-
ously, global warming is a risk for the world; the risk has to be taken into ac-
count by a precautionary environmental policy. The systematic issue is that
competing user exist for the global environment between its role as a public
good for consumption and its function as a sink for greenhouse gases (Siebert
1998b). A solution requires to determine the optimal level of the global en-
vironment (the atmosphere), i.e. the quantity of greenhouse gases to be toler-
ated. This requires to compare the costs of reducing emissions and the benefits
of an improved environmental quality, including the reduction of the risk of
global warning. It also requires to signal the global scarcity to individual coun-
tries. The problem is that in determining the tolerable global quantity of emis-
sion countries can behave as a free rider. The solution also requires to allocate
the total quantity of emissions to the individual countries. This allocation of
property rights poses severe incentive problems including the issue of accep-
tance of a global treaty and the issue that an international contract among
sovereign states is not reneged in the future. This presupposes that the alloca-
tion of emission rights is incentive compatible and that the increased demand
for emission rights of developing countries in the process of their economic
development is taken into account (Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 1998). According to the Kyoto Protocol
emission reduction obligations will be defined for the 1990 level. The obligations
will be tradable.
To what extent the limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse
gases will be a restraint for economic growth is an open question. The institu-
tional arrangement envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol and the results of the-22-
1998-Buenos-Aires conference so far do not represent a specific restraint.
Taking the impact of national environmental policy in the last twenty years as a
frame of reference, environmental policy has had structural effects in reducing
the competitiveness of emission-intensive sectors. By and large, environmental
policy not been a severe restraint for national economic growth.
V. Gains from Globalization
From the politician's point of view, it could be argued that nothing is wrong with
some protectionism which will surely slow down globalization but will restore the
sovereignty of national policies and will calm down social tensions in advanced
countries. From the economist's point of view, however, the advent of a protec-
tionism era comes next to doomsday. For an economist, protectionism is the
biggest avoidable cause of economic harm in the world: Firstly, open markets of
rich countries are an indispensable precondition for developing countries which
want to escape poverty and economic stagnation. And secondly, also the ad-
vanced countries will surely suffer severe welfare losses if the international
division of labor will be repressed.
In public debate, it is the main problem for the economist that the welfare gains
from globalization are almost impossible to measure. "No argument without a
number" is the demanding request of politicians and of the media, but no sound
and reliable number about the potential gains of an intensified international
division of labor can be presented by economic analyses. Protectionists are
often able to argue with concrete examples of jobs which are endangered by
globalization, whereas aggregate efficiency gains resulting from intensified
competition and potential new jobs evolving in a globalized world are hard to
identify and to count. Due to this asymmetry between concentrated gains and
widely spread losses from protection strategies for repressing global competi-
tion are often highly popular in the public.-23-
Despite the methodological difficulties of demonstrating the potential benefits of
global competition for advanced economies, some attempts shall be made to
touch upon at least some of them. The first attempt is concerned with the
terms-of-trade of industrial countries, i.e. with the relative development of their
export prices as compared to their import prices. If this ratio rises, industrial
countries are better off because they have to give in less export goods for the
same amount of import goods or, equivalently, can afford higher imports at a
given level of exports. The ongoing process of globalization is associated with
the integration of large, labor-rich countries into the international division of
labor. China alone disposes of about one fifth of the world-wide labor force, and
India is not much smaller. The contribution of these and other newly integrating
countries to world output is much smaller, because these countries are pro-
vided with little physical and human capital and a rather low technological level
of production. Hence, it can be expected that labor-intensive goods (which are
mainly imported by advanced countries) will become relatively cheap on world
markets, whereas technologically sophisticated an capital intensive goods
(which constitute the major export goods of advanced countries) will face in-
creasing demand and rising prices on world markets.
As a result of these divergent price trends, the term-of-trade of advanced coun-
tries can be expected to improve in the course of globalization. This proposition
is confirmed by the facts; the terms-of-trade of industrial countries have sub-
stantially improved during the past two decades (Table 6). These gains from
globalization would be at stake if the world economy would fall back into pro-
tectionistic practices.
The second attempt to illustrate potential gains from globalization rests upon
the experience of different countries with liberal and less liberal policies. The
basis of this comparison is a pioneering study, from the World Bank (Michaely et
al., 1991) where the trade policy of 31 countries in the post-war period was
carefully examined and where periods of trade liberalization were identified.-24-












































































Source: Gundlach, Nunnenkamp (1997).
According to this study, economic growth after trade liberalization was higher
than before in 23 out of 31 cases. The most prominent examples are presented
in Table 7. It concentrates on the success stories of trade liberalization, but it
also presents the average growth performance for all countries which clearly
supports the case for free trade.-25-
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These country-specific results are in line with the region-specific calculations of
Stoeckel et al. (1990) which are based upon a general equilibrium model of the
Centre for International Economics at the University of Canberra. The status-
quo situation on world markets was compared to a scenario with completely
liberalized trade on the one hand and a scenario with strong protectionism in
the U.S. and the EU on the other hand. In case of completely free trade, world
output would increase by about five percent, whereas a relapse into protection-
ism would reduce world output by three percent. Moreover, unilateral steps to-
wards free trade either by the U.S. or be the EU would be beneficial to each
region, although the welfare gains smaller than the gains from complete liber-
alization. Of course, the results of these simulations depend upon the specific
features of the underlying model, but the calculations of Stoeckel et al. at least
demonstrate that trade liberalization is not a zero-sum game.-26-
The advanced economies would be well advised, therefore, to resist the pres-
sure of special interest groups for protectionism and to proceed on the road to-
wards the integrated world economy. Flexible adjustment to changing world
economic conditions will probably require some painful offerings in the short
run, but will eventually turn out to be beneficial to all participants. History has
repeatedly demonstrated that those who try to escape from structural adjust-
ment will not be able to preserve their Elysium, but will have to face an even
harder landing when their protectionistic shelter is washed away by the relent-
lessly rising tide of global competition.-27-
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